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１． Introduction 
Public diplomacy is growing in importance in world politics, an 
effective tool that a country may utilize to exert its soft power. Countries 
like the United States and British, which have had a long tradition 
practicing public relations activities, are concentrating greater efforts in this 
option. “Middle power” nations such as Sweden and Canada are pursuing 
their agendas through public diplomacy as well. 
In China there is also an increased emphasis on public diplomacy. In 
the aftermath of the Tiananmen Incident and the end of the Cold War, 
China continued on as a socialist country even as the former Soviet Union 
and countries of “Eastern Block” in Europe transformed their economic 
and political systems. China felt increasingly isolated and sensed that the 
international climate was growing increasingly hostile. At that point, China 
earnestly embarked upon a plan to reform their propaganda model and to 
utilize public relations activities to improve its image abroad. These efforts 
involved a series of profound institutional reforms of the public diplomacy 
system and a gradual reprogramming for international cultural exchange 
activities. 
China took steps to boost its public diplomacy following the end of 
the Cold War, as did the industrialized countries. However, China’s public 
diplomacy differs from the West in terms agenda, the relationship between 
the mass media and the government, and even the means utilized. China 
experienced a historical shift from propaganda to public diplomacy after 
1989. This paper will first review briefly the history of China’s propaganda 
activities, and then examine the objectives of China’s current public 
diplomacy strategy and, analyze the way in which it is practiced. The 
concluding remarks will identify the defining features of China’s public 
diplomacy and its limitations. 
 
 
２． From propaganda to public diplomacy 
(1) Propaganda or public diplomacy 
Public diplomacy is now widely considered to be a strategic tool of 
national foreign policy, however the notion of public diplomacy remains 
ambiguous. When coining the term “public diplomacy” in 1965, Edmund A. 
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Gullion used it as a euphemism for propaganda, trying to avoid the 
negative connotations. Some scholars contend that public diplomacy differs 
from propaganda: Public diplomacy seeks to build audience trust by 
“public, open, interactive, global communication”, 1 while propaganda 
coerces audience based on secrecy, partial disclosure or disinformation. 
While public diplomacy may emphasize openness and accuracy for 
the information conveyed by the government, one can not distinguish 
public diplomacy from propaganda only by judging the “truth” of released 
information. The methods using in public diplomacy or propaganda are, in 
effect, the same. The distinguishing factor is, in fact, the underlying 
political system as a source of “truer” information. Unlike the propaganda 
activities under the totalitarian regime, the information conveyed by a 
democratic government tends to be reviewed and argued by other domestic 
factors such as media, social groups. As a result of this check and balance 
mechanism, the public diplomacy builds trust by open and interactive 
communication.  
Based on their similarities and the idea that the main difference 
between public diplomacy and propaganda stems from the underlying 
political system, this paper defines China’s external public relations 
activities in the post cold war era as Public Diplomacy, and as propaganda 
prior to that. This assertion is also supported by the following facts. 
First of all, the objective of China’s public diplomacy is 
fundamentally different from that of propaganda. While the propaganda 
activities in Cold War were informed by the ideology of communism, 
public diplomacy now aims to re-brand China as a peaceful global citizen. 
Secondly, the external public relations activities are not controlled 
solely by the government; there is now, a kind of tension between the 
government and the mass media due to the reform and open policy since 
1978 which provides, to some extent, a check and balance. 
Finally, public diplomacy is now targeting at a global audience 
where its effect can be measured in terms of world opinion and economic 
performance.  
 
                                                  
1 Zaharna, R.S., “From Propaganda to Public Diplomacy in the Information Age”, in Y. 
Kamalipour & N. Snow eds., War, Media, and Propaganda: A Global Perspective, New 
York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004, p.223. 
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(2) The Traditional Tools of Propaganda in China 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has a long tradition of 
propaganda 2 . Propaganda activities started with the provision of 
information to the foreign public, press and government shortly after the 
CCP was established. The first propaganda magazine “The Pioneer”, whose 
main readership was overseas Chinese, was published in 1928 in San 
Francisco. This irregular magazine provided information concerning the 
goals, policies and activities of the CCP, exposed the devilish war crimes 
conducted by the Japanese army in China. Later on, the CCP gradually 
expanded the varieties of its publication, “Voice of China” was published in 
Shanghai in 1930s, and “China Digest” was issued in 1940s. The CCP’s 
encounter with Edgar Snow, who was famous for his book “Red Star over 
China” in 1936, opened the road for leveraging foreign journalists to gain 
publicity for its policy. In addition, the first foreign language broadcast,  
“Yanan Japanese radio station” was first established in Yanan in 1940s. 
Thus, the basic tools used in propaganda can be generally classified 
under the heading of information activities. Regular publications, leaking 
the favorable information to the chosen foreign journalists, and foreign 
language broadcasting were the three traditional sources of propaganda.  
These three traditional methods of propaganda were then inherited 
after the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was founded in 1949. Two state 
magazines were published, “People’s China in English in 1950 and 
“Beijing Review” in 1958. International broadcasting was also established 
in 1950s. 
Compared to the publications and the international broadcasting, the 
option of using specific journalists as a source of publicity was less 
predictable and more time-consuming. Shortly after the foundation of PRC, 
the CCP prohibited all the activities by foreign journalists in China, except 
for few reporters from Soviet Union and East European. In early 1950s the 
Prime Minister Zhou Enlai and Vice Prime Minister Chen Yi voiced that 
China should take “a more active policy” toward foreign journalists, but 
that was to wait until the Geneva Conference in 1954 when China actually 
                                                  
2 The term of propaganda in Chinese has two different meanings: one is the external public 
relations activities (Duiwai Xuanchuan), the other is domestic publicity activities (Duinei 
Xuanchuan, or simply Xunachuan). Propaganda used in this paper refers to the former meaning, 
that is the activities aimed at the foreign public. 
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restarted contact with foreign journalists. In July 1955, one year after the 
Geneva Conference, Zhou Enlai gave further instructions to Vice Foreign 
Minister Zhang Wentian, Foreign Minister Assistant Qiao Guanhua that the 
Information department in Foreign Ministry should encourage visits to 
China by foreign journalists, and urged them to draft some specific 
guidelines. Zhou Enlai, reiterated this initiative in 1957, in response to a 
visit request raised by West German journalists. He approved the request 
saying that China should take advantage of the western media, and let them 
help serve China’s national interests. Since then, China revived the old 
custom, using the chosen foreign journalists to serve its own foreign 
policies. 
Thus, the three basic tools of propaganda--regular publications, 
leaking the favorable information to the chosen foreign journalists, and 
foreign language broadcasting--were re-installed after the PRC was 
founded. Through the endorsement and funding of the Chinese government, 
the nationalized propaganda enterprise has developed rapidly into a 
gigantic and complex corporation. For example, each accountable to three 
different levels of administrative government, are publishing a broad range 
of magazines, booklets, pamphlets, brochures and other special 
publications, often in multiple language editions. On the top administrative 
structure is China International Publishing Group (CIPG) that produces the 
well-known “four major propaganda publications (Beijing Review, China 
Pictorial, China Today 3 and People’s China)”, the mid level publishers 
belong to the International Culture Association, which are under the 
supervision of province or autonomous regions. Those publishers run by 
social groups that actually operate under the supervision of the province, 
can be grouped into a third level of the vertical administrative system. All 
in all, there is a wide assortment of propaganda publications in China. 
To make its propaganda strategy effective and successful, China 
pursed an isolation policy by separating China from the outside world 
(Neiwai Youbie) especially in terms of information. That is to say, 
propaganda in China in the Cold-War period was based on a policy that 
blocked information flowing in and out of China. Obliviously, this policy 
was not sustainable after the reform and open policy, and especially in the 
view of web-based information services now in place.  
                                                  
3 When first published in 1952, the magazine was titled as “China Reconstructs”. 
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(3) Transformation from Propaganda to Public Diplomacy 
The remarkable change from propaganda to public diplomacy can 
be seen in its external public relations activities. In the revolutionary Mao 
era, “Mao Zedong thought (Maoism)”, class struggle and the continue 
revolution are the main themes for propaganda. The adoption of reform and 
open policy marked a departure from the Maoism. In the post-cold war 
period, China clarified its four objectives for public diplomacy each year. 
These four objectives appeared in each year’s policy program:  (1) Form a 
desirable image of the state; (2) Issuing rebuttals to distorted overseas 
reports about China; (3) Improving the international environment 
surrounding China; and (4) Influence the policy decisions of foreign 
countries.4 
 In October 2001, another step was taken at the National Conference, 
where, in addition to building a desirable image of the Chinese state in the 
minds of foreign audiences, a new task was imposed on external public 
diplomacy, which was to contribute to the country’s economic 
development.  
Thus, building a desirable image of the state, publicizing China’s 
opinions to the outside world, and promoting business activities both within 
and outside China are the objectives of China’s public diplomacy in the 
post-Cold War era. These goals of public diplomacy were gradually shared 
and supported by the Chinese people in the latter half of the 1990s. In 1996, 
a book titled China Can Say No! (Zhongguo Keyi Shuobu), a harsh critique 
of the United States authored by Zhong Guo, et al., became a sensational 
bestseller, and in the same year a book titled Behind A Demonizing China 
(Yaomohua zhongguo de beihou), that was edited by Li Xiguang, a 
professor at Tsinghua University at that time, also became a bestseller. In 
the latter book, Li Xiguang and other contributors, whose expectations of 
the United States had been upset, argued that the American masses were 
imbued with an “ugly, demonized image of China” cooked up by the 
                                                  
4 Zhang Kun, “A brief discussion on the nine important relationships in external 
propaganda” (Luelun duiwai xuanchuan de jiuda guanxi), Research Section, the State 
Council Information Office, ed., Collected Papers on Foreign Propaganda 
Maneuvering(Duiwau Xunchuan Gongzuo Lunwen Ji), Beijing: China Intercontinental 
Press, 1998, p. 73. 
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American media.  
It is still widely believed by the Chinese people that the Western 
media actively demonizes China with biased reports on China. Such a 
perception is also shared by the government leaders, and continues to be an 
objective of China’s public diplomacy. Government research indicates that 
90% of the news on China reported by the US media is negative. As 
evidence, the Chinese government cites the practice, now more than 10 
years running, of airing the same video, a young man standing in front of 
the tank moving toward to Tian Anmen square, just before June 4th each 
year, despite dramatic changes in China since that time. Zhao Qizheng, 
who is in charge of public diplomacy as Minister of the State Council 
Information Office, believes China needs to counter the undesirable image 
of  “an undemocratic China” propagated by the media in the industrialized 
countries, and stated so in a speech in early 2004:5 
 
“More than 80 percent of international news is now supplied 
by news agencies of advanced countries. It is indispensable for 
China to explain itself to counter the image shaped by these media 
of advanced countries. It is especially important for us to give high 
priority to offering explanations to the international community 
about matters such as the human rights issue, the Tibetan and 
Taiwanese questions, the issue of religion, the Falun Gong cult 
question, and the theory of a ‘China threat’.” 
 
As this speech suggests, the Chinese government regards public 
diplomacy as a means of countering the Western media, a means of doing 
away with the “negative, demonized image of China” that they spread 
around the world. According to a study by Hongying Wang, throughout the 
1990s the Chinese government strived to build an image of China as “a 
major power devoted to collaboration with the international community and 
to the safeguarding of peace.”6 This led to the adoption in 2004 of the 
concepts of “peaceful rise” and “peaceful growth” in China as the guiding 
                                                  
5 Zgai Zizheng, “To formulate a favorable public opinion in the world”（Nuli Jianshe 
youliyu Woguode Guoji Yulun Huanjing）, Journal of Foreign Affairs College, third 
quarter, 2004, p. 3. 
6 Hongying Wang, National Image Building and Chinese Foreign Policy, China: An 
International Journal (Vol.1), March, 2003, p.52. 
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principles for China’s public diplomacy.  
 In 1990s, the purpose of China’s public diplomacy became more 
and more clear, that is to defuse the negative image of China stereotyped by 
the major broadcast networks like CNN, BBC, or in the words of the 
Chinese government, the purpose of “explaining China.” Obviously, 
China’s public diplomacy is devoted to attaining a more focused purpose 
than that in the West. This focus on upgrading its global image determines 
the strategy and sets the tone of Chinese public diplomacy today. 
 
 
３． China’s Public Diplomacy in Action 
In addition to changing objectives, fundamental change can also be 
observed in the style of China’s public diplomacy which is now more 
imploratory and responsive to the needs of its international audience. 
Acknowledging that China is losing the war of public diplomacy, Zhao 
Qizheng, Minister of the State Council Information Office and Director of 
the CPC Central Committee’s Foreign Propaganda Office, asserted that in 
order to create a favorable international public opinion, “we must from now 
on have greater awareness of the need to provide better services, study the 
needs of overseas audiences, provide them with large quantities of 
information, help them understand China better, and make it possible for 
them to make use of various opportunities available in China.”7 The 
speeches of Zhao demonstrates China’s willingness to move away from 
propaganda era, shows its willingness to compete in the global market 
place governed by the rules of  “supply and demand”.  
Traditionally, China disseminated information abroad primarily 
through three channels: publication of periodicals, selective contacts with 
foreign correspondents, and foreign-language broadcasting. Since the 
1990s, however, in the age of the rapid evolving information technology, 
China has adopted more diversified means of implementing its public 
diplomacy.  
According to the definition adopted by the former United States 
Information Agency (USIA), public diplomacy is a form of diplomacy that 
a country carries out in order to promote its national interest and garner 
international support through understanding, informing, and influencing the 
                                                  
7 People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao), October 15, 2001 and January 30, 2002. 
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foreign public and broadening dialogue between its own citizens and 
institutions and their foreign counterparts. As is evident in this definition, 
public diplomacy is understood to encompass two kinds of activities, 
namely, information furnishing activities (dissemination of information 
abroad and international broadcasting), and international education and 
cultural exchange activities. In fact, U.S. public diplomacy encompasses 
each of   these two aspects. By contrast, Great Britain’s public diplomacy 
now places strategic emphasis on mobilizing the BBC World Service, the 
British Councils, and other means in such a way as to “disseminate 
information to the foreign public and inculcate positive images of Britain 
amongst them.”  ( insert:  In the British model there isn’t an emphasis on 
international education or cultural exchange). 
China’s public diplomacy in the post-Cold War era, with its 
emphasis on both providing information and international education, is 
closer to the American model.  However, given the difference in the two 
countries’ social and political institutions, and in the objectives the public 
diplomacy is expected to serve, China’s public diplomacy has 
characteristics that differ markedly from that of the United States.  
 
(1) The Traditional Tools for Promoting Public Diplomacy 
The reorganization of offices responsible for guiding external 
publicity activities began in the 1990s. In 1991, the Information Office of 
the State Council was established as the chief office administering national 
external publicity activities. The Vice Governor of each provincial 
government was assigned to double as the head of the provincial 
government’s propaganda bureau, and the government began to earmark 
expenses for external public activities under a separate heading of its 
annual budget.  
 In the wave of the reform and open policy, and affecting by the 
rapid development of IT, the three traditional tools for promoting public 
diplomacy evolved along different paths. 
Restrictions on foreign correspondents and journalists have been 
removed gradually beginning in the 1980s.  All reporters are now able to 
get a press card in China, and allowed to cover all stories except on 
sensitive political issues, such as the Falun Gong cult question, human 
rights, Taiwan and Tibet.  Recently, the Chinese government announced 
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that they would revoke the nominal interview permission rule during the 
Beijing Olympic in 2008 to temporarily replace press restrictions. In this 
case, the Chinese government chose active information dissemination over 
a more strict restriction. 
International radio broadcasting, whose audiences are limited to 
foreign listeners, has undergone impressive development under the 
guidance and support of the government as a state-owned corporation. The 
total broadcasting hours reaches over 1100 hours per day and it covers 
38-languges and four Chinese dialects.8  
In comparison, other mass media with audiences living both inside 
and outside of China, such as TV broadcasting stations and publishers, 
were required to adopt a corporate management system and challenged to 
become financially self-supporting in the early 1990s. The reform had the 
effect of transforming China’s mass media into a news reporting industry, 
which by 1998 emerged as the country’s fourth largest industry in terms of 
taxes paid, topping the tobacco industry. Under the “self-supporting 
accounting system,” the media earn approximately 70% of their revenues in 
the form of advertising revenues, which amounted to an estimated 45.6 
billion yuan in 2002, an explosive increase when compared to revenues of 
118 million yuan in 1983.  
By agreement, China’s membership in the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), means the restrictions imposed on foreign medias will eventually 
been withdrawn. In 1982, when “Sesame Street”, the famous cartoon for 
children broadcasting in 140 countries, was introduced in China, Shanghai 
TV Station had to work with Fudan University to remake the cartoon into a 
Chinese version. Now cartoons, like the well-known Japanese animation 
“Chibi Maruko-Chan” (Little Maruko), are broadcasting directly in China 
without any need of revision.  
Facing the inevitable future challenge from the foreign media, the 
Chinese government announced that, in addition to the first phase of 
becoming “financially self-supporting”, mass media reform should now 
enter a second phase that involves the goal of becoming internationally 
competitive. Following a trend of media integration during the latter half of 
the 1990s, a number of large-sized multimedia groups have been 
                                                  
8 “In commemoration of China’s international radio broadcasting” (Jinian Zhongguo 
Renmin Duiwai Guangbo Shiye), People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao), December 4, 2006. 
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established in China.  These groups, in an effort to boost their 
international competitiveness and to promote international publicity 
activities, have expanded overseas. More specifically, these multimedia 
groups set up operations abroad in collaboration with foreign media that 
sought entry into the Chinese market. In exchange for granting these 
foreign media limited licenses to broadcast foreign-made commercial 
programs in China, the Chinese media obtained similar rights in the 
countries of their counterparts. Thus, exchange between the Chinese and 
foreign media is carried out on a reciprocal basis, and the ability to 
broadcast their own programs in foreign countries is an indispensable 
prerequisite for cultivating a cooperative relationship with foreign media. 
Through reciprocal exchange with foreign mass media, CCTV-9, for 
instance, has earned in the United States alone nearly 700,000 subscribers 
for its cable-broadcasting and more than 500,000 subscribers for its satellite 
broadcasting. 
The Chinese mass media is now, on one hand, endeavoring to 
transform itself into a competitive industry, on the other hand, is actively 
engaging in foreign publicity activities. Although, to some extent, a 
relaxation of rules can be seen, China’s mass media continue to be bound 
by the obligation to serve as the “mouthpiece of the Party.” International 
news reporting by the mass media is strictly regulated by the government in 
accordance with a set of detailed guidelines on reporting. As a matter of 
fact, only four organizations are allowed to distribute international news in 
China: China National Radio (CNR), China Radio International (CRI), 
China Central TV (CCTV), and the Xinhua News Agency’s head office. 
 It should be pointed out, however, that the very strict regulations 
imposed on the news reporting activities of the Chinese mass media at 
home are preventing them from sharpening their competitive edge in the 
international market. Their international broadcasting programs, under the 
impact of such regulations, are often too dull and formal, and too heavily 
focused on reports of meetings and conferences to satisfy the needs of local 
audiences.9 Even though the Chinese government in 2004 made it a high 
priority to carry out international publicity activities in a way better tailored 
                                                  
9 The Chinese government has announced, for instance, that only 4 percent of CCTV-9’s 
audiences are non-Chinese. 
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to the customs and needs of overseas audiences,10 it will take some time 
before the Chinese mass media can start winning large non-Chinese 
audiences abroad. 
The publishers were also challenged to transform themselves into 
financially self-supporting operations. Publications that could not reach the 
break-even point were downsized, then eliminated. As a direct result of this 
reform, the size of the publishers was reduced and the number and variety 
of publications decreased. For example, among the four major propaganda 
publications, only People’s China continues to publish magazines in 
Japanese while others have totally withdrawn from the Japanese market.  
Out of the necessity to strengthen its public diplomacy, in 2004, the 
Chinese government relaxed the restriction in order to rebuild the 
publishing sector into a vigorous enterprise. Under the policy called 
“localization of international publishers”, many publishers transferred their 
editorial department abroad to create, edit and publish the international 
magazine locally. This policy intended to reduce the publish time, to create 
timely news focusing on the local readers, and ultimately, to increase the 
sales of a more appealing magazine. It is still too early to evaluate the 
effect of this policy, but it is not hard to predict that the publishers will 
continue to struggle in the “tug of war” between public diplomacy with its 
inherit restriction on content and the harsh reality of profit-making in an 
information age. 
 
(2) Increasing Options for promoting Public Diplomacy 
The current information age challenges China’s PD strategy and 
begs questions such as how to improve the use of websites as a means of 
external publicity, how to operate in this environment to effectively address 
important issues in connection with how China is portrayed, and how to 
establish and effectively operate a system of spokespersons. 
The government is putting special emphasis on addressing sensitive 
topics that have aroused international public opinion hostile to China, such 
as criticisms for violations of human rights and for being a threat to the 
international community. A recent example is the way that China 
                                                  
10 “Li Changchun emphasizes that public diplomacy should focus on the real China and 
make it accepted by foreign audience” (Li Changchun Xiangdiao Waixun Gongzuo Yao 
tiejin Zhongguo Shiji he guowai shouzhong),  http://www.sina.com.cn, April 21, 2004. 
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approached foreign publicity activities for its “Planned Parenthood” 
program, an issue of international attention. During FY 2001, in an effort to 
improve the country’s image abroad, the government revised a website on 
“China’s population and Planned Parenthood,” and issued six revised 
editions of a publication titled China’s Population Today. Moreover, not 
only did the government actively respond to interviews by foreign 
correspondents concerning the planned parenthood program, but also made 
positive approaches to Chinese and foreign reporters, sponsoring two 
international conferences and press briefings. The government periodically 
gathered foreign media reports on Planned Parenthood in China, and 
offered “corrections” to “inaccurate” foreign reports through the pages of 
the China Daily.11  
The release of a  “White paper” is another way of disseminating 
information. The major white papers released during the last two or three 
years include: China’s National Defense, China’s Space Activities, 
Environmental Protection in China, China’s Peaceful Development Road, 
Building of Political Democracy in China, Gender Equality and Women’s 
Development in China, Regional Autonomy for Ethnic Minorities in China 
and etc. A quick glance at all these titles, one can easily grasp the intention 
of China’s public diplomacy, which is to focus on the controversial issues 
such as “China threat”, environmental pollution, human rights, ethnic 
independence and religion issues. 
The Chinese government’s news briefing and spokesman system 
has basically been established at the central, provincial and city 
government level. In early 1982, the Central Leading group for External 
Propaganda drafted the “Proposal Concerning the Establishment of a 
Spokesperson System.” Subsequently, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and 
other ministries of the State Council, who were deeply involved in foreign 
exchange activities, introduced a spokesperson system, and began to 
release information on a somewhat periodical basis. It was the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs that introduced a spokesperson system for the first time in 
China in March 1983, with Qian Qishen, Minister of Foreign Affairs at the 
time, serving as the first spokesperson for the Ministry. In the latter half of 
the 1990s, other government offices such as the National Bureau of 
                                                  
11 “Overall discussion of foreign propaganda activities in FY2001 on planned childbirth”, 
http://www.sfpc.gov.cn/cn/news20030110_2htm (July 23, 2003). 
 13
Statistics, the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, and the 
Information Office of the State Council (beginning in 1993), followed suit, 
establishing news press systems of their own. This spokesperson system 
was meant to boost the national government’s capacity to establish a 
positive image of the state abroad, internationally disseminate credible 
information about China, and make the situation in China known 
throughout the world. 
Toward the end of 2003, the government began to expand the 
spokesperson system from the level of central government offices to the 
provincial government level. As a means of facilitating the introduction of 
the spokesperson system at the provincial government level, a special 
program for training spokespersons was launched with the participation of 
experienced reporters from CNN as part of its temporary staff of 
instructors. 
When the spokesperson system was first established, it was 
supposed to serve three purposes: establishing a positive image of the state, 
disseminating credible information about China, and making the situation 
in China known throughout the world. As the spokesperson system was 
introduced across the country, a new challenge was posed and the Chinese 
government urged the spokesperson to present consistent and unified 
explanations at all government levels, both provincial and the national.  
At present, a system of news release by spokespersons both at the 
central and provincial levels is in operation, disseminating information 
through either of the following three methods: periodic press conferences, 
official State Council briefings on specific policy measures, and 
information disclosure related to unforeseen incidents. In this way, steady 
progress is being made to prepare an institutional system for boosting the 
news-release functions of the spokesperson system.  
There is no denying, however, that the contents of information 
dissemination activities are much more important. As a means of attaining 
consistency in external publicity activities, the existing rule requires each 
individual government office under the jurisdiction of the State Council to 
hold a press conference only after holding a consultation meeting with the 
Information Office of the State Council, where the spokesperson of the 
government office concerned is supplied by officials of the Information 
Office with proposed answers to several dozen potential questions, which 
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are prepared by the Information Office based on its research of public 
opinions both within and outside China.12   
Thus, a complex of news releasing and briefing system has been 
gradually installed in China. Publicity focusing on the sensitive topics, 
white paper, the spokesperson system, all these news briefing activities are 
expected, on one hand, to help enhance social stability and mobilize 
support to government policies through facilitating disclosure of carefully 
controlled information, and on the other hand, to improve China’s global 
image by providing the first hand information on China. 
 
(3) International Cultural Exchange as an Effective Tool for Public 
Diplomacy 
In October 2003, Paris hosted a “Chinese Culture Year,” a cultural 
fair consisting of various programs on the three themes of: “China in 
History,” “A Multi-Faceted China,” and “China Today.” A Chinese 
language education program was launched concurrently with the opening 
of various events of “Chinese Culture Year,” with the result that the 
Chinese language courses offered at the Chinese Culture Center in Paris 
and the events of the cultural fair complemented each other. 
The governments of China and France displayed much enthusiasm 
for “Chinese Culture Year,” with both Chinese President Hu Jintao, and 
French President Jacques Chirac who was praised as “an appreciator of 
Chinese culture and an old friend of the Chinese people,” issuing 
congratulatory messages on the occasion. The opening ceremony for the 
cultural fair was attended by prominent members of the two governments, 
including State Council member Chen Zhili, Minister of Culture Sun 
Jiazheng, and Chinese Ambassador to France Zhao Jinjun, and the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs and the French Ambassador to China. The event proved 
attractive, not only due to the large size of the fair, but also for the novelty 
of its programs that placed emphasis on introducing those aspects of China 
that had previously been relatively unknown. To the two governments’ 
delight, the “Chinese Culture Year” event turned out to be such a great 
success, that Paris was thrown into a Chinese cultural boom. 
In January 2004, when the lingering effect of the boom was still 
present in Paris, President Hu Jintao visited France to celebrate the fortieth 
                                                  
12 Jinghua Times(Jinghua Shibao), February 1, 2005. 
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anniversary of the establishment of the Sino-French diplomatic relations. 
His state visit to France, which was received as a gesture of friendship, 
made a strong impression on the international community about the 
amicable relations between the two countries. Given the great success of 
“Chinese Culture Year” and the positive effect China’s cultural exchange 
programs was having on its diplomacy, China’s cultural exchange 
programs with foreign countries began to draw much attention. 
It should be kept in mind, however, that China has been actively 
cultivating cultural exchanges with many countries around the world for 
many years. Since their inception at the time of China’s adoption of the 
policy for economic reform and opening-up, the country’s cultural 
exchange activities have continued to adopt traditional techniques of 
cultural diplomacy, including the sponsoring of “Chinese Culture Week” 
programs and exhibitions in various countries, and exchange of cultural 
groups, teams of performing artists, and exchange students. The Ministry of 
Culture administers all these cultural exchange activities.  Of the 
approximately 120 agreements on cultural exchange, signed with foreign 
countries between 1949 until 1991, as many as 91 were signed in the period 
from 1978-91.  
As China has increasingly opened itself up to the outside world, it 
has come to place greater emphasis on introducing and disseminating 
Chinese culture to the outside world, rather than introducing foreign 
cultures inside China. As the cultural exchange activities gained 
momentum, it has also begun to develop cultural exchanges not only with 
third-world countries, which used to be their main partners for years,13 but 
also with many countries around the world. Especially noteworthy are 
cultural exchanges with European countries, which, unlike those with Japan, 
the United States, and other countries, are carried out within a traditional 
framework based on inter-governmental agreements such as “cultural 
exchange agreements” and “action plan for the execution of exchange 
agreements.” Since the early 1990s, it has become the dominant approach 
for China and a European country to establish cultural exchange centers in 
each other’s country, and use these as the basis for cultural exchange 
                                                  
13 Of the 79 cultural exchange agreements concluded in the period from 1980 to 1990, 
71, or 89 percent, were with third-world countries. Of the 220 annual programs for the 
execution of exchange agreements that were concluded in the same period, 159 
programs, or 67 percent, were with third-world countries. 
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activities. The year 2003 alone saw a number of new developments in 
China’s cultural exchange activities in Europe, in addition to the “Chinese 
Culture Year” in France. During that year, China sponsored a “Chinese 
Cultural Festival” in Germany, a cultural exchange project with Austria and 
concluded inter-governmental agreements with Italy on the establishment 
of cultural centers in each other’s country. It also opened a China Center in 
Malta, and launched a “China-Spanish Forum” in Spain in collaboration 
with the Spanish government. The only difference between these cultural 
exchange activities and those in France were that these were relatively 
smaller in scale, and drew less attention.  
Gradually China expanded this European style of cultural exchange 
activities to other regions. During the period 1997 to 2001, China 
established 13 cultural exchange agreements and 133 action plans for the 
execution of exchange agreements with foreign countries. A salient feature 
of China’s cultural exchange activities is that they are carried out under 
government initiative and on a reciprocal basis. 
In addition to promoting the cultural agreements and exchanges, 
Chinese language education is also considered to be a useful tool for public 
diplomacy by the Chinese government. The China National Office for 
Teaching Chinese as a Foreign Language (NOCEL) was established in 
1987 that administers the recently created “Confucius Institute” program. 
The program goal is to establish Chinese language schools abroad.  It was 
first drafted in 2002, and two years later in March 2004, the name of the 
Chinese language schools was determined—“Confucius Institute”. 
In October 2004, the State Council officially approved NOCEL’s 
proposal for the “Chinese Language Bridge” (Hanyu Qiao) project. In 
November 2004, the first Confucius Institute under the project was 
established in Seoul. Plans are in place to establish a total of 100 such 
schools around the world through the cooperation of foreign educational 
organizations. To the Chinese government, the Confucius Institute is not 
merely a language institute; it is also a base for introducing Chinese 
Culture to the world.14 
China’s public diplomacy is supported by two main pillars, one 
                                                  
14 “To establish a total of 100 Confucius Institute around the world and to disseminate 
Chinese culture through Kongzi” (Quanqiu Jiang Jian Baijia Kongzi Xueyuan Cong 
Kongzi Kaishi Tuiguang Zhongguo Wenhua), Shangdong News net, August 19, 2005. 
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being the reinforcement of publicity activities to disseminate information 
abroad, and the other being the promotion of external cultural exchanges 
through the time-honored approach and language educational program, as 
symbolized by the sponsoring of the “Chinese Culture Year” in Paris. Even 
though the Chinese government is encouraging the Chinese media to 
expand their operations abroad so as to boost their international 
information disseminating capabilities, the Chinese media still remain a 
much smaller influence in the international market than the powerful media 
machines of the West. Given such a situation, cultural exchange programs 
that make use of more traditional techniques are proving to be a very 
effective means of public diplomacy for China. 
Chinese scholars find cultural exchange activities advantageous 
primarily because they can stimulate cultural development at home, exert 
positive influence on diplomacy, and potentially generate significant 
commercial gains. Starting from the dawn of 21st century, both central and 
local government sponsored a number of cultural related trade fairs, to 
promote export domestic cultural related products to reduce the growing 
deficit with the industrialized countries. China’s strategy of cultural 
exchange with the rest of the world will help drive its objectives for public 
diplomacy and economic success going forward.  
 
 
４． Public Diplomacy - Caught between the Image of China Abroad 
and at Home  
While the effectiveness of using public diplomacy as a means of 
eliminating negative images of China held by citizen’s abroad has produced 
some measure of success, some opinions are surfacing inside China 
questioning whether or not the image of the Chinese state being promoted 
by the government is adequate. 
The concept of China’s “peaceful rise” was coined as a means of 
refuting the theory of a “China threat” and was officially adopted for the 
first time in 2004. In November 2003, Zheng Bijian, then Vice President of 
the Central Party School of the Communist Party of China and 
Director-General of the Forum on China’s Reform and Opening-up, 
presented the concept for the first time at the Boao Forum for Asia. In 
December 2003, Premier Wen Jiabao referred to the concept in his speech 
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at Harvard University, while President Hu Jintao made mention of 
“independent and autonomous foreign policy for peaceful rise” in his 
speech inside China. 
The concept of “peaceful rise” has been debated inside the country 
from various angles. One point of contention is Taiwan issue and whether 
“China can remain peaceful.” This situation reflects the absence of 
consensus about the adequacy of the image of the state which public 
diplomacy tries to forge. 
The same phenomenon can also be found in terms of cultural 
exchange activities. Keeping pace with these developments, International 
Confucian Cultural Festivals and various other events to celebrate 
Confucius have been held within China. Even though the Confucius 
Institutes are expected to serve as an important base for spreading Chinese 
culture abroad, and Confucian philosophy in particular, there is much 
debate as to the role Confucian philosophy should play in China’s national 
learning, and whether there are any other major components that, if 
included, would result in a more comprehensive Chinese national learning 
program. 
Despite the Chinese government’s efforts to sell the idea of “a peace 
loving and a benign China”, and to present Confucius as the typical 
brand-image of China, Chinese people at home are still searching for 
authentic image of China and the true identity of the Chinese.  
In the course of the reforms of diplomacy during the latter half of 
the 1990s, the concept of yimin weiben (reliance on the people) or qinmin 
waijiao (foreign policy close to the people) has circulated inside the 
country as a way of characterizing the new orientation of diplomacy. This 
concept has drawn much attention and has been appreciated both within 
and outside the country as capturing the ongoing change in Chinese 
diplomacy from one for the sake of the state into one for the sake of the 
people. 
A series of new developments that began to emerge since the 1980s, 
such as a sharp increase in the number of Chinese students studying abroad, 
more Chinese firms establishing offshore operations, and a greater number 
of Chinese citizens engaged in economic activities abroad, have resulted in 
a dramatic rise in the number of Chinese firms and citizens involved in 
accidents and incidents abroad, forcing the government to take urgent steps 
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to protect and safeguard the interests of Chinese people and firms abroad. 
In 1997, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs began to strengthen diplomatic and 
consular protection, distributing a pamphlet entitled Guidelines on 
Consular Protection and Services Outside China to Chinese embassies and 
consulates abroad. Beginning in 2003, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
started to provide in its website up-to-date information on public safety and 
security in foreign countries, and to earmark funds for consular protection 
as part of its annual budget. 
The Foreign Ministry’s efforts to provide better services for 
ordinary people traveling abroad was viewed as an attitudinal change and 
had the effect of improving the image of Chinese diplomacy. Against this 
backdrop, Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing in March 2004 used the 
expression qingin waijiao (foreign policy close to the people) as a new 
buzzword describing his ministry’s operations.   
In this way, the government, in its domestic publicity activities, 
places emphasis on creating an image of diplomacy in the “interests of the 
people,” which does not align with the overall objectives of China’s public 
diplomacy program at this time. In the face of rising nationalist 
consciousness within the country, it is becoming increasingly important for 
the government to reconcile the image of diplomacy in the interest of the 
people with the image of China as a large country with a peaceful and 
collaborative posture.  
 
 
５．  Concluding Remarks 
Given the fact that the Chinese mass media have expanded their 
operations overseas, and the fact that a serial news release and briefing 
system has been adopted by government offices at the national and 
provincial levels, it is safe to say that China is already as well equipped, 
and in some cases even better equipped, than many foreign countries with 
the infrastructure necessary to sustain its public diplomacy. With its main 
thrust of eliminating negative images of China circulating abroad, China’s 
public diplomacy is underpinned by the two pillars of external publicity 
activities and cultural exchange activities. 
Unlike the countries of the West, however, China is trying to 
leverage its mass media and cultural exchange programs to drive domestic 
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industries that will be competitive in today’s global economy. In this regard, 
the Chinese government is charged not only with the task of boosting its 
international image, but also with the task of developing sustainable 
multimedia and cultural industries. In 2004, China launched an initiative to 
develop a domestic animation industry, with the goal of producing 
“animated cartoons of the Chinese brand.” The “Chinese brand-image” has 
economic, cultural, and diplomatic components. One salient feature of 
China’s public diplomacy is that it goes hand in hand with the country’s 
policy to nurture infant industries.  
While China’s public diplomacy has proved effective, or even 
successful to some extent by boosting trade and avoiding sensitive issues, it 
is still faced with serious obstacles that must be overcome. China, as a 
developing country, lags behind advanced countries technologically and 
therefore in terms of information disseminating capability. Mass media is 
further restrained by the severe regulations on news reporting to which they 
are obliged to conform in their capacity as the “mouthpiece of the Party,” 
Given these drawbacks China is faced with a wide gap between its 
information infrastructure and capability as compared to that of advanced 
countries.  This is a serious issue in this information-oriented age. 
Initiatives that support the development of information technology and 
remove restrictions on content will help China’s mass media become more 
competitive.  
Initially starting from re-branding China through defusing the 
irritating image of China, China’s public diplomacy is focusing on the 
passive explanation of “What China is not”, without any mention to “What 
China really is”. Actually, one of the hot debates in China now is about 
Chinese identity, including the questions of “Who stands for Chinese 
culture”, “Can Confucius possibly be the traditional culture?” etc.  
In early April 2006, anti-Japanese demonstrations erupted in many 
parts of China with tens of thousands of participants. Underlying these 
outbursts of anti-Japanese sentiment was an increasingly strong confidence 
in their mother country. In a situation such as this, the discrepancy between 
the purpose of creating an image of the state for domestic consumption as 
“representative of the people” and the purpose of creating an image of the 
state for international consumption as the vehicle for “peaceful rise” cannot 
help but be called into question. The extent to which China’s public 
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diplomacy will prove effective in the future depends to a significant degree 
on whether China can successfully build up a domestic consensus on the 
image of the state, and depends to a significant extent on whether China 
can find a way to identify itself. 
 
